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Beneath Sovereignty: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Internationalism 
 in Nineteenth-Century Egypt 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
The rise of extraterritoriality in the nineteenth-century has been described as a transitional 
phase that laid the ground for the construction of territorial sovereignty. Yet in Egypt, where 
a particularly extensive extraterritorial regime emerged in the mid-century, the expansion of 
European jurisdiction underneath national sovereignty became entrenched with the creation 
of international mixed courts in the 1870s. This outcome, the article argues, was the product 
of a complex compromise between European empires, which upheld different conceptions of 
extraterritoriality, and the government of Egypt. While Britain refashioned its own 
extraterritorial judicial system as a means of promoting legal reforms in the Ottoman world, 
France aggressively pursued the expansion of extraterritorial rights as an instrument of 
informal domination and economic exploitation. The creation of an international type of 
jurisdiction, less susceptible to French political pressures but applying a French system of 
law, proved acceptable to all parties, although it severely constrained Egyptian sovereignty 
from within, even after Britain took over the reins of government in 1882. Extraterritoriality 
was not merely a transition, but an original feature of the global legal order, arising out of 
modern imperialism and imperial rivalry and yet conducive to the forging of new instruments 
of international law and governance. 
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At eleven in the morning on 2 September 1873, to enforce a decision from the Cairo Majlis 
al-Tujjār (commercial tribunal), a dozen Egyptian police officers affixed seals on a beerhouse 
in the city’s Azbakeya gardens. For two years, the beerhouse’s leaseholder, Joseph Escoffier 
and, after his death in December 1871, his widow Delphine, née Golf, had refused to pay a 
rent of 3250 francs per quarter, on the mostly spurious grounds that the Egyptian 
administration of gardens and plantations had not abided by the terms of the lease. The 
Escoffier beerhouse was hardly a major commercial venture. Delphine Escoffier ran the shop 
with her daughter, Lisa Rosé, and one indigenous waiter. The beerhouse had at its disposal 
fifty tables and, in addition to beer, only sold “some ham, sauerkraut, salamis, sausages and 
various types of cheese.” Yet French consular authorities took Delphine Escoffier’s protests, 
against the court’s “arbitrary decision” and the police’s “act of savagery,” very seriously. The 
French consul in Cairo denounced such “a flagrant violation of capitulations, treaties and 
confirmed customs” as evidence of the Egyptian government’s “very obvious tendencies to 
try and equate foreigners with mere rayas” or Ottoman subjects, deprived of elementary 
rights in Western eyes. On 3 September, he had the consulate’s own seals affixed to the 
beerhouse, in order to manifest France’s jurisdiction. In an allusion to the project of new 
Egyptian tribunals for foreign residents, France’s consul general in Alexandria also 
interpreted the event as “a first attempt of the Egyptian government to obtain indirectly the 
anticipated reform it is hoping for” and he referred the case to the comité du contentieux 
(litigation department) of the ministry of foreign affairs.1 
The Cairo consul’s solicitude for the Escoffier beerhouse may have been related to the 
fact that Delphine Escoffier’s son-in-law, Jules Rosé, a law graduate, was himself an “agent 
d’affaires” (business agent), who pleaded before French consular courts in Egypt and was 
																																																						
*I am extremely grateful to the much missed Christopher Bayly, Andrew Arsan, Emma Rothschild and the 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article, and to Omar Cheta 
for making available to me the text of his important doctoral dissertation on Egyptian commercial tribunals in 
the nineteenth century. 
1 “Cahier des charges. Causes et conditions spéciales à la concession du droit d’exploitation d’un établissement 
de brasserie,” 1 May 1871; Delphine Golf, veuve Escoffier, to the French consul in Cairo, 3 Sep. 1873; French 
consul in Cairo to Albert de Broglie, minister of foreign affairs, 13 Oct. 1873; Marquis de Cazaux, consul 
general in Alexandria, to Albert de Broglie, 16 Oct. 1873; La Courneuve, Archives Diplomatiques (hereafter 
AD), Contentieux, 254, folder “Escoffier.” Joseph Elzéar Escoffier was born in Apt (Vaucluse) in 1824, the son 
of a farmer, and had been in Egypt for some time, since he was almost certainly the Joseph Escoffier who had 
been caught up in a suit and a counter-suit after he rented out an ice-cream making machine to a Russian 
subject; see “Décès de Joseph Elzéar Escoffier,” AD, Etat civil des français de l’étranger, Le Caire, 4, 9 Dec. 
1873; birth certificate n°245 dated 31 Dec. 1824, in birth register for the year 1824 at 
http://archives.vaucluse.fr/documents-numerises/ (consulted 11 Aug. 2016); and Escoffier v. Swawinsky, 30 
Aug. 1864, Nantes, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter CADN), PO/20/1. 
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employed by the Cairo consulate to witness acts of civil registration.2 But the endorsement of 
the consul general and the elevation of the case to the comité du contentieux were 
symptomatic of the extreme sensitivity of the French diplomatic and consular services to 
possible infringements on France’s extraterritorial jurisdiction throughout the Levant and in 
Egypt in particular. The case’s importance probably also lay in the beerhouse’s highly visible 
and symbolic location: following the erection of new European quarters to the west of Cairo 
in the 1860s, the Azbakeya square, transformed into a fenced public garden, found itself at 
the very centre of Egypt’s capital. Next to the Azbakeya garden stood Cairo’s opera house, 
inaugurated in 1869 and where Verdi’s Aida had its world première in 1871. Soon after 
Egypt’s judicial reform was completed, although not quite on the terms desired by the 
Egyptian government, in 1876, the garden became flanked, on the opposite side, by the new 
Cairo tribunal for foreign residents.3 The site perhaps also held a special place in French 
memories, since it had hosted several public ceremonies during the country’s occupation of 
1798-1801, including the erection of a wooden obelisk to celebrate the sixth anniversary of 
the French Republic, in the presence of Bonaparte, on 21 September 1798.4 The affixing of 
Egyptian seals on a shop which “flew the French flag” according to Delphine Escoffier could 
therefore be seen as a significant challenge to the extensive regime of regime of 
extraterritoriality enjoyed by the French – and other Europeans and their protégés – in 
Egypt.5  
The expansion of European extraterritoriality in the mid-nineteenth century has 
traditionally been interpreted as an informal variety of imperialism, enabling European 
powers and their nationals to obtain some of the benefits of imperial domination without 
having to bear the substantial costs of sovereignty. A greater awareness of the historical 
prevalence of legal pluralism outside Europe, combined with legitimate critiques of the 
analytical vagueness of informal empire as a concept, have tainted this view with 
Eurocentrism and undermined its force. Lauren Benton, in particular, has downgraded the 
imperial significance of extraterritoriality, by construing it as a brief and ambivalent form of 
																																																						
2 For instance Jules Rosé was the lawyer of the milliner Olympe Clément in her suit for assault against Lucie 
Gervais, taylor, before the consular court of Cairo in 1868, Aix-en-Provence, Archives Départementales des 
Bouches-du-Rhône, 2 U1 1489, folder 7; on Rosé’s witnessing of civil registration acts, see AD, Etat civil des 
français de l’étranger, Le Caire, 4, passim. 
3 Janet Abu-Lughod, “Tale of Two Cities: The Origins of Modern Cairo,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 7 (1965): 429-57; Alix Wilkinson, “Gardens in Cairo Designed by Jean-Pierre Barillet-Deschamps,” 
Garden History 38 (2010): 124-49.  
4 André Raymond, Egyptiens et Français au Caire, 1798-1801 (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 
1998), 108-9. 
5 Delphine Golf to the French consul in Cairo, 3 Sep. 1873, AD, Contentieux, 254, folder “Escoffier.” 
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interaction which in reality accelerated the adoption of state-centred legal regimes to prevent 
encroachment by would-be imperial powers. Her conclusion, mainly based on the example of 
Uruguay, that extraterritoriality paradoxically assisted “the construction of sovereignty,” 
appears valid for Latin America after its independence, where Europeans failed to obtain 
formal extraterritorial rights. Yet Benton’s cautious suggestion that the same logic may be 
seen to operate in regions such as the Ottoman world and China, where Europeans 
consolidated or obtained formal extraterritorial rights, is open to dispute.6 Diplomatic and 
military considerations, rather than internal legal reforms, determined the abolition of 
extraterritoriality, after a hundred years, in Turkey in 1923 and China in 1943.7  
Focusing on the example of jurisdictional politics in the autonomous Ottoman 
province of Egypt, this article argues that extraterritoriality could also serve as a potent 
instrument for hollowing out, rather than constructing, sovereignty. After 1840, Egypt 
witnessed the development of a particularly extensive regime of extraterritoriality for its fast 
growing population of European residents. As predicted by Benton, the process elicited 
sustained efforts by the Egyptian government to enact legal reforms and reassert its 
jurisdictional authority.8 In 1876, these efforts culminated with the creation of new mixed 
courts, which clawed back a great deal of the civil jurisdiction assumed by European 
consulates. Since the new courts emanated from the authority of the Khedive (hereditary 
Vice-Roy), this judicial reform has sometimes been hailed as a reassertion of Egyptian 
sovereignty.9 In practice, however, the new courts, dominated by a majority of Western 
magistrates appointed by their respective governments, successfully fended off the Egyptian 
(Anglo-Egyptian after 1882) government’s attempts to regulate them. Popularly known as 
“international courts,” they exercised their jurisdiction over most of Egypt’s economic life 
under a mere veneer of Egyptian sovereignty until 1949.10 
																																																						
6 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Culture: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 6: “Constructing Sovereignty: Extraterritoriality in the Republic of 
Uruguay,” 210-52; see also Richard S. Horowitz, “International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam 
and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of World History 15 (2004): 445-86.  
7 Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire and 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
8 Omar Cheta, “Rule of Merchants: the Practice of Commerce and Law in Late Ottoman Egypt, 1841-1876,” 
PhD dissertation (New York University, 2014). 
9 This view in the scholarly literature originates with the account of a former American judge on the mixed court 
of appeal, Jasper Y. Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-
24; see also Mark S. W. Hoyle, Mixed Courts of Egypt (London: Graham & Trotman, 1991), 1-11 and Nathan 
Brown, “The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 25 (1993): 33-52.  
10 Byron Cannon, Politics of Law and the Courts of Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 1988), 37-88; see also Benton, who noted that in Egypt “[t]he mixed-court system … made 
international legal influence ‘quasi-permanent’”, in Law and Colonial Cultures, 246. 
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The internationalization of extraterritoriality proved the condition of its extensiveness 
and durability in Egypt. In her work on the British imperial constitution in the nineteenth 
century, Benton noted the tendency of British officials to borrow from international law as 
they imagined Britain as the ultimate mediator of a global system of states deprived of some 
external attributes of sovereignty, or “quasi sovereigns” in the extreme case of Indian 
principalities.11 Jurisdictional politics in Egypt suggest that European governments and 
lawyers conversely borrowed from imperial practices such as extraterritoriality to create, 
outside Europe, international institutions independent of a single sovereign. The division or 
layering of sovereignty is now seen as an important feature of modern European imperialism, 
but arrangements that limited sovereignty from within, by national or international means, 
have not received as much attention as external limitations.12 Such imperial enclaves beneath 
sovereignty may have been less numerous and less visible on maps of empire than colonial 
possessions or protectorates. Yet their prominence in strategic locations of the global 
economy, such as Egypt or China’s coast, suggest that they played a nodal role in the world’s 
legal regime at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 Although this article pays due attention to Britain’s efforts at global legal ordering, it 
focuses on the role of another imperial formation, France, in order to highlight the 
significance of interaction between empires in the origins of Egypt’s international regime of 
extraterritoriality. Before Britain’s occupation in 1882, France was at least as intrusive an 
imperial power in Egypt as Britain.13 Pointing to French legal interventionism, a British 
lawyer even claimed that France wielded “semi-sovereignty” in Egypt by the early 1870s.14 
For reasons both ideological and pragmatic, French officials upheld a much more assertive 
conception of extraterritoriality than their British counterparts. Egyptian resistance and 
British reservations forced the French government to concede the necessity of judicial 
reform. Yet French reluctance imposed a compromise that internationalized civil jurisdiction. 
Reform arguably transformed rather than curtailed French influence, since the new courts 
																																																						
11 Lauren Benton, “From International Law to Imperial Constitutions: the Problem of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870-
1900,” Law and History Review 26 (2008), 595-619; see also Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: the 
British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2016), esp. 18-24. 
12 An exception is Mary D. Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-
1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); on the layering of sovereignty, see Jane Burbank and 
Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010).  
13 La France et l’Egypte à l’époque des vice-rois, 1805-1882, eds. Daniel Panzac and André Raymond (Cairo: 
Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2002). 
14 James Carlile MacCoan, Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt (London: G. Norman, 1873), 42. 
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applied codes inspired by French legislation and drafted by a French lawyer. It therefore 
internationalized French law as well as civil jurisdiction in Egypt. This was an acceptable, if 
not the favoured outcome from a French official perspective: in Delphine Escoffier’s case, 
the comité du contentieux eventually deemed her protest groundless, after punctiliously 
ascertaining that the proceedings of the Cairo Majlis al-Tujjār‘s and the substance of its 
decision conformed with French commercial law.15 
Such a focus on the French utilization of extraterritoriality and Anglo-French 
interactions risks minimizing the influence of the Egyptian government, its Ottoman suzerain 
and other European imperial powers on the internationalization of extraterritoriality in Egypt. 
Despite these limitations, this approach may still help correct the prevalent Anglocentrism of 
scholarship on global legal regimes and empire in the nineteenth century. In addition, it offers 
a note of caution against the temptation to romanticize the sharing of sovereignty, by showing 
that such arrangements served to diminish as well as preserve the autonomy of polities 
confronted with European imperial ambitions.   
 
 
The rise of imperial extraterritoriality 
 
Freely conceded by the Ottoman Sultan from the sixteenth century, the “Capitulations” did 
not initially manifest European dominance. Instead, they were mutually advantageous 
arrangements that conformed to the strong form of legal pluralism in force in the Ottoman 
Empire, where numerous non-Muslim subjects as well as foreign communities enjoyed a 
large measure of self-jurisdiction. Foreign merchants under the capitulatory regime were very 
few in numbers and lived in segregated quarters without the right to purchase property.16 Yet 
from the mid-nineteenth century, as domestic difficulties and military setbacks rendered the 
Ottoman Empire more sensitive to external pressures, extraterritoriality became a privileged 
																																																						
15 The decision was also grounded in a stipulation of the lease signed by Joseph Escoffier that renounced 
consular jurisdiction, a self-denial of extraterritoriality which the French ministry’s legal advisers did not wish 
to condone; see the minister of foreign affairs to the consul general in Alexandria, 19 Nov. 1873, AD, 
Contentieux, 254, folder “Escoffier.” On the adoption of French commercial legislation by the Ottoman Empire 
in the 1850s, see Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2011), 26. 
16 Feroz Ahmad, “Ottoman Perceptions of the Capitulations, 1800-1914,” Journal of Islamic Studies 11 (2000): 
1-20; Maurits H. van der Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and 
Beratıcs in the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Karen Barkey, “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the 
Ottoman Empire,” in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850, eds. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New 
York: New York University Press, 2013), 83-107. 
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status that benefited tens of thousands of Europeans. The term “Capitulations” remained 
widely used, but increasingly as “an appropriated idiom for the extension of imperial 
power.”17  
The legal transformation of the Capitulations into an instrument of Western 
domination may be connected with the rapidly increasing use of international treaties by 
European powers to manage both intra-European affairs and their relations with extra-
European states, or what has recently been described as a “treaty-making revolution” between 
1830 and 1860.18 Historians of “free trade imperialism” have sometimes cited the Anglo-
Ottoman treaty of Balta Liman in August 1838 as marking the advent of a new asymmetrical 
relationship between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, but perhaps for erroneous, 
narrowly commercial reasons since it did not reduce already very low customs duties on 
exchanges of commodities with Europe. 19 The imperial significance of Balta Liman appears 
to lie instead in the subordination of some aspects of Ottoman municipal law to international 
agreements. In particular, it transformed the capitulatory regime from a free concession into 
an international obligation. While the previous Anglo-Ottoman treaty, in 1809, had merely 
restored the Capitulations as they had been issued by the Sultan before the outbreak of war in 
1807, article 1 of Balta Liman asserted that the “rights, privileges, and immunities” conferred 
upon Britons “by the existing Capitulations and Treaties” were “confirmed now and for 
ever.”20 Two months later, France secured a similar rewording of its own capitulatory 
rights.21 Despite a vague promise to revisit extraterritorial arrangements, which would not be 
kept, the multilateral treaty of Paris that concluded the Crimean War (1853-1856) confirmed 
the incorporation of the Capitulations into international law.22 
																																																						
17 Will Hanley, “Foreignness and Localness in Alexandria, 1880-1914,” PhD dissertation (Princeton University, 
2007), 15. 
18 Edward Keene, “The Treaty-Making Revolution in the Nineteenth Century,” International History Review 34 
(2012), 475-500.  
19 See for instance John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History 
Review, 2nd series, 6 (1953): 11, and Reşat Kasaba, “Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman 
Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of World History 4 (1993): 215-41. On the limited tariff 
implications of Balta Liman, see Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 28-31. 
20 A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations, at Present Subsisting 
between Great Britain & Foreign Powers, ed. Lewis Hertslet, 31 vols. (London: Butterworth, 1827-1940), V: 
506-10; compare with article 4 of the treaty of 1809, in Hertslet, A Complete Collection of the Treaties and 
Conventions, II: 370-77. 
21 Recueil des traités de la France, 23 vols., ed. Jules de Clercq (Paris, 1864-1907), IV: 439-43, article 1; 
compare with articles 2 and 3 of the peace treaty of 1802, in Clercq, Recueil, I: 588-90.    
22 On the status of the Ottoman Empire in international law, see Jennifer Pitts, “Boundaries of Victorian 
International Law,” in Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-
Century-Political Thought, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72-3, and Davide 
8	
	
Together with a sustained boom in commercial exchanges, this legal transformation 
facilitated a sharp increase in European migration across the Mediterranean in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century.23 The growing numbers of European residents, in turn, 
rendered tangible the implications of the new legal regime and profoundly transformed 
extraterritorial consular justice. Looking back over the previous decades in 1876, the French 
consul in Tunis drew a stark contrast between the present situation and that prevailing in the 
1830s. Then, only a few “honourable” French merchants resided in the Levant and their 
disputes were mostly settled by conciliation, in or out of court. But from the 1850s, French 
“colonies” became dominated by “a floating population made up almost exclusively of small 
traders, sutlers etc. and from that moment our Consular courts have been flooded by a 
multitude of heretofore unheard of cases,” such as “payment of rents” or “promissory notes 
for negligible amounts.” Conciliation did not avail with these “wild people,” most of whom 
were “tribunal regulars,” and consular litigation experienced “a tremendous increase.”24 The 
number of appeals against civil and commercial decisions by French consular courts in the 
Levant, which were heard by the court of Aix-en-Provence (a prerogative it inherited from 
the Old Regime’s Parlement de Provence), rose sevenfold in less than fifteen years, from 
approximately four cases annually in 1848-50 to twenty-eight in 1862-4.25 In Alexandria, the 
number of decisions by the French consular court increased fivefold in just five years, from 
forty-two in 1858 to 210 in 1862.26  
Imperial extraterritoriality expanded thanks to immigration rather than the 
jurisdictional protection European consulates could grant to Ottoman subjects and their 
families. If anything, the numerical incidence of this type of protection – not to be confused 
with the looser political protection that certain European powers enjoyed over some 
Christians or Jews – appears to have declined in the mid-nineteenth century.27 Not only did 
																																																						
Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 47-54. 
23 Julia Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North-Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800-1900 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Paul Caruana Galizia, Mediterranean Labor Markets in the 
First Age of Globalization: An Economic History of Real Wages and Market Integration (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2015). 
24 Théodore Roustan, consul general in Tunis, to Louis Decazes, minister of foreign affairs, 18 July 1876, AD, 
752SUP/114. 
25 Louis Féraud-Giraud, De la juridiction française dans les échelles du Levant et de Barbarie, 2nd ed., 2 vols. 
(Paris, 1866), I: iii-iv.  
26 “Statistique des jugements rendus par les tribunaux consulaires de Constantinople et d’Alexandrie,” n.d. 
[1863], AD, 752SUP/113. 
27 However, consulates with very few national residents, such as the United States, appear to have continued to 
grant jurisdictional protection on a more extensive scale; see Ziad Fahmy, “Jurisdictional Borderlands: 
Extraterritoriality and ‘Legal Chameleons’ in Precolonial Alexandria, 1840-1870,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 55 (2013), 305-329. On protection in general, see Salahi Sonyel, “The Protégé System in 
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the Ottoman government make sustained efforts to limit protection to indigenous employees 
of foreign consulates, but European immigrants also exercised considerable pressure against 
the conferring of consular jurisdiction upon Ottoman subjects so as to reduce economic 
competition.28 The complaint of an anonymous “Anglo-Levantine” about the British consuls’ 
“great eagerness to assist their protégés,” to the point of giving preference to “a crafty Greek 
or a wily Armenian” in return for bribes over “their own countrymen,” was typical.29 In 1864, 
France’s consular district of Beirut, larger than modern Lebanon, counted only ninety-nine 
French indigenous protégés, a very modest figure given the intensity of the region’s 
commercial and cultural connections with France.30 
Among immigrants under consular jurisdiction, a distinction needs to be drawn 
between metropolitan and imperial subjects. If consular authorities were usually keen to 
affirm their jurisdiction over the former, they frequently complained about what they 
perceived as the excessive litigiousness of the latter. The make-up of each consulate’s subject 
population therefore induced different preferences in terms of jurisdictional politics. For 
instance, Britain and France’s subject populations throughout the Ottoman Empire were of 
comparable size, with estimates by consular authorities of 11,500 for Britain in 1863 and 
14,300 for France in 1871.31 Yet the majority of British consular subjects hailed from 
imperial possessions, especially Malta, Gibraltar and the Ionian islands (until the latter were 
ceded to Greece in 1864), whereas the majority of French consular subjects were French 
																																																						
the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Islamic Studies 2 (1991): 56-66; on the distinction between political and 
jurisdictional protection, see Cihan Artunç, “The Price of Legal Institutions: The Beratlı Merchants in the 
Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Economic History 75 (2015): 727 and Rodogno, Against 
Massacre, 30. 
28 See for instance the Ottoman “Règlement relatif aux consulats étrangers,” [8 Aug.] 1863, which restricted 
jurisdictional protection to eight employees per consulate general, six per consulate and four per vice-consulate, 
beyond which numbers a dispensation from the Ottoman ministry of justice was required, in CADN, 
92PO/A/331.    
29 Our Consuls in the East: a Parliamentary Inquiry into their Proceedings Imperative (London: Pigott, 1855), 
19-20. 
30 “Liste des protégés du Consulat général de Beyrout [sic] et des agences qui en relèvent,” 30 Oct. 1864, and 
comments by Marquis de Moustier, ambassador in Constantinople to Eugène Poujade, consul general in Beirut, 
29 Nov. 1864, CADN, 92PO/A/331; on French influence in Lebanon, see Andrew Arsan, “ ‘There is, in the 
Heart of Asia … an Entirely French Population’: France, Mount Lebanon, and the Workings of Affective 
Empire in the Mediterranean, 1830-1920,” in French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories, 
eds. Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 76-100.   
31 Edmund Hornby, judge at the supreme consular court of Constantinople, to Lord Russell, foreign secretary, 
15 Sep. 1863, in Kew, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FO 780/334; “Statistique des Français résidant à 
l’étranger d’après les documents transmis par les agents diplomatiques et consulaires,” 1874, AD, 28ADP, 11. 
Both figures, based on undependable methods such as voluntary registration, almost certainly underestimated 
the number of permanent residents, and did not take into account large numbers of temporary residents; unlike 
the British figure, the French one excludes native protégés. 
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citizens, despite a significant and rising proportion of imperial subjects from Algeria.32 
France, and most other European powers whose proportion of imperial subjects was probably 
even lower, would therefore have been more naturally inclined to promote extraterritoriality 
than Britain. 
The expansion of imperial extraterritoriality also affected the Ottoman world 
unevenly, with Egypt – setting aside the case of Algeria, turned into a settlement colony after 
France’s invasion in 1830 – experiencing the largest influx of European migrants. Due to 
Egypt’s lavish government spending on infrastructures and amenities, a boom in cotton 
cultivation during the American Civil War and the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
the “Klondike on the Nile” saw its population of immigrants under foreign jurisdiction leap 
from 6000 in 1840 to 100,000 in the 1880s.33 France was the great power with the largest 
population of consular subjects: approximately 17,500 out of 80,000 foreign residents c. 
1870, against only 6000 British consular subjects.34 A large majority of French nationals in 
Egypt were of European descent and enjoyed full citizenship. In the Cairo consular district in 
1871, such citizens represented 76% of the French population, against 24% of Algerian 
subjects, according to the local French consulate. Their proportion in Alexandria and the 
Suez isthmus was almost certainly higher because the al-Azhar mosque attracted large 
numbers of Algerian students to Cairo.35 By contrast, colonial subjects, especially from 
Malta, continued to form the bulk of the British population in Egypt: in Alexandria in 1888, 
only 26% of British residents hailed from the British Isles and 62% from Malta.36 The Anglo-
French demographic divergence of jurisdictional incentives mentioned above was particularly 
stark in Egypt.   
The rapid expansion of foreign jurisdiction as a result of immigration in Egypt was 
compounded by the adoption of a more extensive regime of extraterritoriality than elsewhere 
in the Ottoman world. In the rest of the Empire, exclusive consular jurisdiction was confined 
to litigation between Europeans, while Ottoman courts retained jurisdiction over mixed 
Ottoman-European cases, but with the European party enjoying the assistance of a consular 
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dragoman (interpreter) and a right of appeal to the Sublime Porte in Constantinople. From the 
1850s in Egypt, by contrast, and in flagrant contravention of the text of the Capitulations, it 
only became possible to sue foreign residents before their own consular court, a practice 
justified by the maxim actor sequitur forum rei (the plaintiff must follow the forum of the 
thing in dispute). 
Why the Egyptian government tolerated such a drastic divergence of jurisdictional 
rules from the rest of the Ottoman world is unclear. Following the imposition of the 1840 
Convention of London that restored a modicum of Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt but 
conceded him hereditary rule, the Vice-Roy Muhammad Ali at first emulated Ottoman efforts 
to contain European jurisdiction. Hence the creation of new mixed courts with a majority of 
indigenous judges (Majālis al-Tujjār) to settle all mixed European-indigenous commercial 
cases in the 1840s.37 Contemporaries often attributed the court’s failure to impose their 
jurisdiction on foreign defendants to the desire of Muhammad Ali’s second successor, Sa’id 
(1854-1863), to encourage the settlement of Europeans who would assist Egypt’s economic 
development. One may also speculate that the Egyptian administration, keen to assert its 
autonomy from Constantinople, saw in the expansion of consular jurisdiction a lesser evil 
than the multiplication of appeals before the Sublime Porte. In any event, the French and 
most other European consular authorities eagerly seized the opportunity, securing full 
criminal and civil jurisdiction for their subjects as defendants by the mid-1850s. British 
consular justice expanded more reluctantly, only adopting the actor sequitur forum rei rule in 
imitation of other European consulates in 1860 in Alexandria and in 1861 in Cairo.38 In less 
than thirty years, an exceptionally wide regime of extraterritoriality, rooted in international 
rather than domestic law, had replaced the limited legal pluralism of the Capitulations in 
Egypt.  
 
 
Two conceptions of extraterritorial governance 
 
European powers responded to the expansion of extraterritoriality in different ways. Such 
differences reflected divergent interests, such as the respective proportions of metropolitan 
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and imperial subjects within each population under consular jurisdiction, but they were also 
determined by different ideas about the legal ordering of the world. In particular, it is possible 
to distinguish between a British conception of extraterritoriality, as a transitional instrument 
towards the incorporation of extra-European polities into a state system under British-led 
international supervision, and a French conception, more intent on using extraterritoriality to 
secure immediate political influence and economic advantages.     
In Britain’s case, the expansion of extraterritoriality in the Ottoman world – and the 
Far East after the conclusion of unequal treaties with China, Siam, Korea and Japan – 
resulted in an ambitious reorganization of consular justice, culminating with the creation of 
autonomous orders of jurisdiction, headed by supreme consular courts in Constantinople 
(1857) for the Middle East and Shanghai (1865) for East Asia. Following the abolition of the 
Levant Company in 1825, the 1843 Foreign Jurisdiction Act clarified the judicial powers of 
British consuls in the Levant and authorized the Crown to issue further regulations by means 
of Orders in Council.39 The 1843 Act has sometimes been described as foreshadowing the 
territorial imperialism of the late nineteenth century, but a recent review of the evidence has 
shown that it chiefly aimed at asserting control over unruly – especially Maltese and Ionian – 
subjects in Ottoman lands.40 Far from aspiring to an indefinite expansion of British 
jurisdiction, James Hope-Scott, the main drafter of the legislation, already looked forward to 
“the formation of one system of jurisprudence for all the Europeans in the Levant, by which 
means the international questions would be reduced to a conflict between Turkish and 
Christian law,” as a further transitional stage before legal reforms rendered possible territorial 
Ottoman jurisdiction.41 
In the wake of the Crimean war, an Order in Council completed the reorganization of 
Levantine consular justice with the creation of two positions reserved for professionally 
trained lawyers, a supreme judgeship in Constantinople and a judgeship in Alexandria.42 The 
lawyer Edmund Hornby, who drafted the Order in Council after a mission to supervise the 
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disbursement of a British loan to the Ottoman Empire, went on to serve as the first supreme 
judge in Constantinople between 1857 and 1865. Hornby, a disciple of the legal thinker John 
Austin, and whose uncle had been a secretary of Jeremy Bentham, may be considered a 
minor figure of the utilitarian movement.43 In line with the utilitarian model of reform 
through emulation, Hornby’s instructions, drafted by the foreign secretary Lord Clarendon, 
another Benthamite sympathizer, expounded a conception of extraterritorial justice as the 
setting of an example that would gradually transform Ottoman institutions along liberal 
lines.44 Insofar as was possible, decisions should be grounded in English law and procedure 
imitate that of England’s “County Courts.” Clarendon also encouraged Hornby to draft a new 
“Levant Code,” which could guide indigenous magistrates as well as British consuls. 
Ottoman judicial institutions should be educated, not trampled upon: “you will never lose 
sight of the principle that the best mode of obtaining influence, is by good example, and that 
the surest method of inducing the Turkish Government to imitate more closely the legal as 
well as the commercial systems of Europe, is to demonstrate by evidence of actual every day 
experience, that those systems conduce more certainly than those of Turkey to the wealth, 
independence, and happiness of a nation.”45 
Hornby’s correspondence with the foreign office contains countless instances of his 
personal contempt for the inefficiency and corruption of Ottoman institutions. His memoirs 
also upheld trenchant views on the hierarchy of races: “Nothing can or will alter the fact that 
the white man will and must use the black man for perhaps centuries to come, not as an equal 
but as an inferior.”46 Yet his correspondence suggests that he abided by his instructions and 
rarely sought to interfere with Ottoman institutions. Indeed, when he wished to exercise the 
slightest pressure on the Ottoman ministry of the interior or an Ottoman court, he requested 
the foreign office’s permission.47 Hornby focused instead on improving British consular 
justice, going on repeated inspection tours of consulates, from Belgrade to Bagdad. Most 
consulates he visited, he later recollected, “had … absolutely no records or even notes of the 
cases they had tried, or in fact any evidence of their official or judicial action for any number 
of past years” before he reorganized them.48 Even when in Constantinople, he reported to the 
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foreign office, “[a] very great portion of [his] time [was] taken up in perusing desptaches 
with their enclosures from the Outlying Consulates & in writing instructions in answer.”49  
Perhaps most typical of Hornby’s conception of extraterritoriality as a means of 
promoting Ottoman reforms, and further betraying the influence of Bentham’s ideas given the 
latter’s enthusiasm for a new panoptic style of incarceration, was the proposal he repeatedly 
put forward (in vain) for the creation of an “International Prison” for criminals convicted by 
consular courts in Alexandria. Not only would economies of scale reduce the running costs of 
all European consulates in Egypt, but “Independently also of all question of expense it would 
be difficult to estimate the importance which the example of a well conducted Prison might 
have upon the local authorities.”50 In 1865, Hornby’s successful reorganization of consular 
justice in the Levant earned him the newly created position of supreme judge in Shanghai, in 
which capacity he oversaw British extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Far East until his 
retirement in 1876. Under his helm, the Ottoman world arguably served as the laboratory of 
what might be termed a British panoptic conception of imperial extraterritoriality, with 
consular judges watching over the reform efforts of indigenous officials.  
Despite being faced with at least as significant an increase in extraterritorial litigation 
as Britain, France pursued much less ambitious reforms. In part this was because the French 
diplomatic and consular service, especially in the Levant, had already been put on a more 
professional footing in the late eighteenth century. The ordinance of 1778, barely amended in 
1836, remained seen as providing sufficient legal legitimacy and clear procedural guidelines 
for the consuls’ judicial role. From the 1780s, French consuls also received a training in law 
and languages, needed to sit examinations, were salaried and had good prospects of career 
progression.51 British consuls consulted on the desirable course of reform in the 1850s often 
hailed France’s organization – “the French system is superior”, the British consul in Tunis 
admitted – and confessed to relying themselves on the ordinance of 1778 for procedure and 
Napoleonic codes for the substance of their decisions.52 British officials also praised the 
quality of France’s dragomans, who played a crucial role in interactions with Ottoman 
officials: “much is necessarily left to their discretion and they have enormous power in the 
way of winning and marring a cause,” Hornby explained in a report that lamented the “the 
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difficulty of obtaining Englishmen, who have sufficient knowledge of the language, and of 
the Turkish character,” and the need to recruit instead Levantines whose loyalty to British 
interests was dubious.53 By contrast, most French dragomans continued to be native 
Frenchmen, often trained at the Ecole des jeunes de langues, based in Paris and 
Constantinople.54   
Conversely, the efficacy of French consular judicial and other activities benefited 
from the growing proficiency in French of Ottoman and Egyptian officials in the mid-
nineteenth century. A good command of French became a requirement in the upper echelons 
of Ottoman bureaucracy in the 1850s, and Khedivial Egypt began to use French as an 
administrative working language in the 1860s.55 Cultural complicity between French agents 
and local high officials, who had often spent several years in in Paris during their youth, has 
only left faint traces in the archives, but its role in fortifying French influence can be 
detected, in Egypt, in the contrast between the amiable and jocular tone of Franco-Egyptian 
exchanges of correspondence and the stilted or faulty French employed by British officials in 
their communications with the Egyptian administration. Famously, cultural complicity was a 
major ingredient of the prodigious success met by French adventurers in Egypt such as the 
director of the Suez Canal Company Ferdinand de Lesseps, a childhood friend of Sa’id, or the 
banker Edouard Dervieu, who had married the daughter of Sa’id’s French tutor.56 The 
meteoric ascent of François Bravay, the son of a saucepan seller in Languedoc who inspired 
Alphonse Daudet’s novel Le Nabab (1877), also relied on “an intimacy” and “a familiarity” 
with Sa’id nurtured by Bravay’s “bons mots, puns and racy jokes.”57 
Changes in the organization of French consular justice were incremental and designed 
to consolidate French informal predominance rather than transform local institutions. At the 
ministry of foreign affairs, the comité du contentieux, created in 1835, saw its composition 
and purview enlarged in 1853. Made up of law professors and prominent political figures, 
including former ministers, it became charged with interpreting “the provisions of treaties 
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and international customs.”58 Its functions therefore included policing the boundaries of 
France’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, as when it pronounced against Delphine Escoffier’s 
request for consular protection in 1873. In 1862, a commission of the ministry of foreign 
affairs envisaged, but eventually decided against emulating Britain’s creation of a separate 
order of jurisdiction for the Levant. The costs, it argued, would be high, while the prestigious 
court of Aix-en-Provence was not so distant from the Eastern Mediterranean that it could not 
remain France’s de facto supreme court for Levantine consular justice. In order to manage the 
increase in litigation, the ministerial commission opted instead to imitate the model of the 
newly constituted Italian consular justice – after the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy in 
1860 – and create consular judgeships in the busiest consulates.59 French consular justice 
therefore remained an appendage of the metropolitan judiciary, a situation characteristic of 
the French penetrative rather than panoptic conception of extraterritoriality. 
Creating a judicial model susceptible of encouraging legal reform does not seem to 
have been a significant concern in French debates about extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, 
attention focused on ensuring that French consular justice retained the material means of 
handling the increase in litigation and upholding the legal guarantees for expatriate 
Frenchmen that the local judiciary was allegedly unable to provide. The language of 
civilization and improvement was not absent from these discussions, but the work of 
civilizing was understood as being carried out by French immigrants rather than reformed 
Egyptians. If the British panoptic conception of extraterritoriality bore the stamp of utilitarian 
ideas, it is tempting to describe the French penetrative conception as Saint-Simonian, 
especially as numerous French adepts of Saint-Simonianism, a mystical exaltation of 
industrial capitalism, settled in Egypt after 1830.60 Both the British panoptic and the French 
penetrative conceptions are open, in different ways, to the charge of Eurocentric hypocrisy: 
the British one was more arrogant, the French one more predatory. Limiting French economic 
predation would in fact constitute a major goal of Egyptian efforts, aided and abetted by the 
British government, to overhaul extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
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The economics of judicial reform 
 
Most analyses of Egypt’s judicial reform have stressed its long-term political significance, as 
having either laid the ground for colonial occupation in 1882, or sown the seeds of nationalist 
agitation, often led by Egyptian lawyers trained in the new mixed courts, after 1900.61 Yet 
very few of the actors involved in the decade-long controversy over judicial reform (1867-
1876) invoked a desire to defend or subdue Egypt’s sovereignty. Instead, the immediate 
cause of the reform lay in economic abuses of extraterritoriality, especially by French 
residents, and its chief objective consisted in reorganizing, rather than curtailing or extending, 
extraterritorial rights beneath Egyptian sovereignty.    
Accounts of Egypt’s judicial reform often attribute its conception and eventual 
adoption to the tireless efforts of Nubar Pasha, a leading minister of Sa’id and his successor 
Isma’il (1863-1879). In 1867, Nubar submitted an eloquent memorandum to European 
governments that proposed the creation of new mixed tribunals that would take cognizance of 
all mixed civil, commercial or criminal litigation. The new tribunals and an appeals court in 
Alexandria would be made up of an equal number of European professional magistrates and 
indigenous judges trained in Europe, with a casting vote for one of the latter acting as 
president. The memorandum employed a liberal language to denounce the extension of 
extraterritoriality beyond the text of the Capitulations, “a system which really leaves the 
administration without power, and the people without any regular justice in their intercourse 
with Europeans.” Yet it should not be confused with a cultural or even political nationalist 
manifesto, since it acknowledged that “progress cannot come except from Europe,” argued 
for further harmonization of Egyptian legislation with France’s commercial, civil and 
criminal codes, and even described “the organization proposed [as] traced upon the judicial 
organization of [French colonial] Algeria.” 62  
The temptation to lionize Nubar as an early advocate of Egyptian independence ought 
therefore to be resisted. Born in Smyrna into a Christian Armenian family, educated in 
Geneva and at the Collège de Sorrèze near Toulouse, the secondary school favoured by 
French West Indian planters for their male offspring, he served twice as Egyptian Premier 
during Britain’s occupation before retiring to Paris. In his memoirs, written in French and 
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only published in the 1980s, Nubar took great pride in the eventual adoption of the reform, 
after he toured European capitals to lobby foreign ministers and presided over two 
international conferences, the one in Cairo in 1869-1870 and the other in Constantinople in 
1872-1873.  Yet he described the reform as a “Magna Carta” destined to introduce 
“liberalism” in Egyptian life rather than assert national sovereignty. The memoirs repeatedly 
stressed his attachment to the land of Egypt, but somewhat in the manner of a colonial 
administrator, frequently sneering at Oriental ineptitude, as when he mocked an alleged 
attempt by Egyptian lawyers to draft a civil code: the text, Nubar claimed, contained only 
thirteen articles, one of which enjoined magistrates not to fall asleep during audiences.63   
Nubar’s memoirs also admitted that a paramount practical consideration behind the 
proposed reform was a desire to get rid of dubious claims against the Egyptian government, 
which had to be settled by costly indemnities after tortuous political negotiations with the 
consuls. Such claims, “most of them French” and often unfounded, amounted “to a fantastical 
number of millions [of francs].”64 Nubar claimed to have first devised his scheme for a new 
order of jurisdiction spontaneously, while he accompanied Sa’id on an official visit in Britain 
in 1862: “How this idea came to me, I do not know.”65 In reality, he is likely to have been 
inspired by an early project of “regular Egyptian tribunals” with foreign judicial officers put 
forward by Robert Colquhoun, Britain’s General Consul, to Sa’id and “the best educated of 
the natives” in the Vice-Roy’s entourage the previous year. Colquhoun’s chief goal was 
already to eradicate “the claims against the government which would not for a moment bear 
being submitted to a proper tribunal” and had been “fertile sources of profits to persons 
unworthy of bearing the name of merchants.” According to the British official, the five last 
large indemnities, one of them to the French adventurer Bravay (Daudet’s Nabab) and none 
to a British subject, would have sufficed to “pay a fourth of the Vice Roy’s debts.”66  
Judicial reform was of course not a solely British project. It chimed with the Egyptian 
government’s sustained efforts since the 1850s to improve the efficiency of commercial 
tribunals, the Majālis al-Tujjār.67 However, the latter remained unpopular, even with British 
officials who were keener than their European counterparts to bolster Egyptian jurisdiction. 
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Colquhoun lamented that they could only deal with “simple matters of commerce.” Henry 
Calvert, the British Consul in Cairo, complained that, in 1861, “many hundreds of 
Commercial suits [were] lying unsettled” before his city’s Majlis and that their proceedings 
had “hitherto been characterized by abuses and irregularities flagrantly opposed to justice.”68 
In his 1867 memorandum, Nubar admitted that the Majālis al-Tujjār had been “deserted” by 
Europeans.69 The project of reform may therefore be construed as an Anglo-Egyptian 
collaborative effort, with both Colquhoun and Nubar placing an emphasis on the replacement 
of the local merchants who sat as judges on the Majālis al-Tujjār by foreign and foreign-
trained professional magistrates as the crucial aspect of the reform.  
The archives of the French ministry of foreign affairs’ comité du contentieux, to 
which claims for indemnity were often referred, offer a good insight into the system of 
predation which the reform sought to suppress. For instance in 1866, Barthélémy Carbonel 
lodged a claim for 1.5 million francs, alleging that the governor of Alexandria had breached a 
contract by which he had undertaken, in 1865, to buy at a fixed price an unlimited amount of 
hay for five years (the contract was part of the Egyptian’s government efforts to replace the 
country’s livestock that had been decimated by an epizootic disease the previous year). 
Successive French consuls pressed the claim, until the comité du contentieux, pointing to the 
lack of supportive evidence and the poor character of Carbonel, a debt-ridden adventurer 
from Marseille, ruled against it in 1869.70 The comité’s decision was perhaps influenced by 
Carbonel’s politics, since his Parisian counsels were well known members of the republican 
opposition to Napoleon III, including the future president Jules Grévy. Significantly, 
following the advent of a more liberal administration in 1870, the comité reviewed its 
decision and the Egyptian government consented to an examination of the claim by a Paris 
tribunal. The tribunal dismissed it as baseless in 1872 and the Paris appeals court upheld the 
dismissal the following year.71 Yet the intervention of French metropolitan courts in a claim 
by an Egyptian resident against the Egyptian government was revealing of the extraordinary 
reach of French judicial interference.  
In the heated “affaire du bazar” between 1866 and 1869, the French government 
supported the claims of French trade more energetically. This case also illustrates another 
																																																						
68 Colquhoun to Russell, 12 Aug. 1861, TNA, FO78/1591; Henry Calvert to Colquhoun, 17 Oct. 1861, TNA, F0 
141/44. 
69 Nubar, “Note,” 7. 
70 “Avis” by the comité du contentieux, 11 May 1869, AD, 752 SUP/119.  
71 “Consultation pour M. Carbonnel” by R. Magnier, J. Grévy, G. Nogent-St-Laurent and V. Lefranc, 18 Feb. 
1869, and cutting from the Gazette des Tribunaux, 15 Nov. 1873, in AD, Contentieux, 252, folder “Affaire 
Carbonel”.  
20	
	
way in which French consular justice, by assuming the right to establish the Egyptian 
government’s civil responsibility, eroded Egyptian sovereignty from within. In 1866, dozens 
of Muslim tradesmen in the Alexandria bazaar declared themselves insolvent. Their French 
creditors accused them of having dissimulated most of their assets prior to the liquidation, a 
manoeuvre described by the French and Ottoman Codes of commerce as “fraudulent 
bankruptcy.” If these allegations were true, it suggests that indigenous merchants promptly 
learned to use French commercial law as cunningly as the characters of Honoré de Balzac’s 
Comédie Humaine.72 Confirming that consular pressures to obtain indemnities were not 
reserved to a social elite, the affected French merchants were all at the head of “new 
businesses, which came to Egypt in order to extend the outlets of their country’s factories.”73 
Egyptian mixed commercial tribunals issued sentences favourable to French claims, but 
several influential Muslim merchants – including the son of the bazaar’s sheik, and two 
Alexandrian landlords who rented out properties to Europeans – carried out successful 
political and legal manoeuvres to prevent their execution, leading the comité du contentieux 
to agree with the French consul that the Egyptian government should be held responsible for 
the fraudulent bankruptcies. The latter eventually paid an indemnity of £18,000 (c. 450,000 
francs), representing a third of the claim initially supported by the French consul, to eighteen 
French merchants.74 
Soon after he settled the “affaire du bazar,” Eugène Poujade, the consul general and 
an old Levantine hand in the consular service who had served in Bucharest, Beirut and Tunis, 
drew up a summary of the twenty-nine claims he had successfully pressed on the local 
government since his arrival in Egypt eight months earlier. Twenty of these claims (including 
the bazaar’s) resulted in indemnities amounting to 900,000 francs in total, another four in the 
granting of pensions to former French employees of the Egyptian government together worth 
an annual 13,000 francs, and yet another five in measures such as tax exemptions for which 
no monetary value was given.75 These data suggest an order of magnitude of 1.5 million 
francs per year, or approximately a far from negligible 100 francs (c. £4) per French resident 
– a little more if one discounts France’s Algerian subjects, who never seem to have benefited 
from the claims system. Some of these claims may have been justified, but one understands 
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that British and Egyptian officials were inclined to describe French consular activism as a 
racket.  
Yet even as French consuls, the comité du contentieux or Paris tribunals arrogated to 
themselves the right to settle most French-indigenous litigation, there is scant evidence that 
such an extensive practice of imperial extraterritoriality elicited an aspiration to territorial 
rule. On the contrary, French consular officials tended to express their satisfaction with the 
status quo, which guaranteed French commerce and residents a privileged status without the 
costs of colonial administration. Opposition to reform, as well as support for it, was rooted in 
economic considerations, and in a desire to maintain French preponderance underneath 
Egyptian sovereignty. 
 
 
Disentangling the Franco-Egyptian legal knot 
 
Opinions about judicial reform were not, however, determined exclusively by nationality. A 
majority of European residents, including Britons, opposed the reform, because consular 
justice appeared more accessible and more likely to defend their privileges than a judicial 
order under the nominal authority of the Khedive.76 Conversely, large capitalist concerns, 
including French banks which owned most of Egypt’s floating debt and the French-
dominated Suez Canal Company, favoured a jurisdictional reorganization that would simplify 
their own legal affairs and improve Egypt’s solvency. The web woven by decades of 
extensive extraterritoriality underneath national sovereignty was complex and multisided. It 
was particularly the case of France and Egypt’s legal entanglement, which determined 
numerous features of the international controversy over Egyptian judicial reform and shaped 
many of the reform’s final contours. 
Thus the chief assistant of Nubar’s campaign for judicial reform was the French 
lawyer Paul Maunoury. In particular, it was Maunoury who persuaded Nubar to place an 
emphasis on the interlocking of jurisdictions – Egypt counted seventeen consular courts, in 
addition to indigenous courts, and appellate courts were inconveniently located in Ancona, 
Trieste, Aix-en-Provence, Constantinople etc. – over a single territory as a feature that would 
shock European opinion, even though it was not experienced as a major problem in a country 
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accustomed to a plurality of legal regimes.77 Maunoury’s own pamphlet in favour of reform 
consisted in a study of four cases that reached a judicial dead end as a result of jurisdictional 
overlapping. All four cases – involving French, British, Belgian, Italian, Prussian, Egyptian 
and Ottoman nationals or companies – were commercial, with three of them concerned with 
land property and the fourth with the purchase of shares in a financial company, which tends 
to confirm that the push for reform stemmed more from economic considerations than an 
abstract concern with sovereignty.78 Maunoury went on to serve as Nubar’s secretary during 
the international conferences on Egypt’s judicial reform, and was charged with drafting six 
new codes of Egyptian legislation.  
 Maunoury’s assistance to Nubar in opposing the French Bonapartist government may 
have had political motives, since he had resigned from the magistracy and left France to 
found a commercial law practice in Alexandria after Louis-Napoleon’s coup in 1851, and he 
served as a republican MP in France after 1880. Yet we also know from a complaint he 
lodged in 1881 with the comité du contentieux that he did not work for Nubar pro bono. His 
assistance earned him a considerable 550,000 francs, although he believed the Egyptian 
government still owed him another 850,000 francs. Interestingly, in support of his claim, 
Maunoury emphasized that his work of codification was not a mere transposition of the 
French legal system, but instead owed a great deal to his frequent consultation of Egyptian 
legal or religious scholars such as Muhammad Qadrī, the author of  an influential treatise on 
religious foundations (waqfs), and Mustafa al-‘Arusi, a staunchly reforming rector of the al-
Azhar Mosque until 1870: “it is easy to see when browsing the [Egyptian] Civil Code 
especially,” he contended, “that I did not make a mere modification of the French code. I 
gave Muslim law a formulation in French law.” The French ministry of foreign affairs 
refused to support Maunoury’s claim, encouraging him instead, with a touch of irony, to 
pursue it before the new Egyptian tribunals he had helped to create.79 
Ferdinand de Lesseps and several other French leading figures of the Suez Canal 
Company also vocally demanded the end of the Egyptian “judiciary Babel.”80  The Suez 
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company was itself a legal hybrid, under French law for internal litigation and Egyptian law 
for external matters, although in practice it remained under French consular jurisdiction until 
1876. Suez’s director may have sincerely believed in the advantages of reform, but it is likely 
that he also wished to cultivate the goodwill of the Egyptian and British governments. On the 
other hand, the staunchest adversaries of reform were also almost all French. The main 
source of opposition was the French ministry of foreign affairs, where Levantine hands were 
influential: both Léonel de Moustier, minister between 1866 and 1868, and Charles de La 
Valette, minister between 1868 and 1869, were former ambassadors in Constantinople. Nubar 
saw Moustier as the main adversary of reform, because the minister realized that its adoption 
would result in “the end of [French officials’] pressure, their daily interference with the most 
ordinary affairs of Egypt.”81 Professional magistrates, led by the conservative Bonapartist 
Louis Féraud-Giraud, a judge at the court of Aix-en-Provence and the author of a reference 
work on French consular justice in the Levant, also resisted reform. As Nubar later 
reminisced with a dubious pun, “Mr Féraud-Giraud’s book laid down the law [faisait la loi] 
on these matters at the Quai d’Orsay.”82  
In 1867, a ministerial committee made of diplomats and magistrates, including 
Féraud-Giraud, rejected Nubar’s proposal or any attempt at jurisdictional unification, on the 
grounds that Egypt was “a country of still incomplete civilization, where the most diverse 
mixture of races, customs, habits, religious beliefs, social conditions would render the 
uniformity of legislation and justice unachievable.”83 Despite this and other dilatory 
manoeuvres, the French government gradually bowed to international pressure – not only 
Egypt and Britain, but also most other European powers favoured the proposal, with only 
Austria, Italy and Greece sharing some of France’s misgivings – until the Cairo conference 
overruled French objections and pronounced itself in favour of a comprehensive unification 
of civil and criminal jurisdiction in January 1870. French acquiescence was facilitated by the 
liberalization of the Bonapartist regime and the ascent as Premier of Emile Ollivier, himself a 
former legal counsel of the Khedive, who consented to a judicial reform limited to civil 
jurisdiction.84 Yet the Franco-Prussian war and the ensuing collapse of the Second 
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Napoleonic Empire further delayed the reform’s adoption. In a concrete illustration of the 
degree of Franco-Egyptian legal entanglement, the first version of the codes drafted by 
Maunoury, which had been printed in Paris, could not be sent to Egypt until the Prussian 
army lifted the siege of the city in January 1871.85 
When negotiations resumed with a second international conference in Constantinople 
in 1872, military humiliations and domestic political turmoil had stiffened French opposition. 
The Supreme consular judge in Constantinople, who served as the British delegate at the 
conference, reported to his government that the French delegate remained “hostile to any 
genuine scheme of judicial reform”: “on more than one occasion, his intention to render the 
project of reform useless, and to neutralize the effectual working of the new Tribunals was 
plainly expressed.”86 Even after the conference, in March 1873, adopted a project broadly 
similar to the one approved three years earlier, the French government raised countless new 
difficulties, for instance by requesting exemptions for members of religious orders, a larger 
number of French magistrates in the new courts, special provisions for the seizure of 
indigenous property concealed in harems, etc.87 
The ill-will of the French government reflected not only the continued opposition of 
officials, but also, increasingly, the pressure of French public opinion. French residents in 
Egypt petitioned profusely, with only major capitalists supporting the reform and the vast 
majority opposing it: “if one studies the name of each of those who petitioned for or against 
the project of reform, one will see on which side stand the principal merchants, bankers, 
etc.,” a pamphlet in favour of the reform noted.88 The discontent of French expatriates 
received a sympathetic hearing in a French public prone to interpret any modification of the 
status quo as a symptom of national decline after the disasters of 1870 and 1871. Reform, the 
British ambassador reported, was “distasteful to Frenchmen generally”: in addition to “a very 
pertinacious opposition in the official Departments,” the French government had “to contend 
with a strong national feeling in and out of the [National] Assembly.”89  
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Metropolitan hostility to the reform was abetted by a French newspaper specifically 
founded to oppose it in 1870, La France en Orient, and numerous pamphlets. A common line 
of argument, perhaps inspired by the contemporary hardening of racialist views in colonial 
Algeria, underlined the impossibility of transposing European judicial institutions to a 
Muslim country.90 Aristide Gavillot, an assessor at Cairo’s French consular tribunal, 
inveighed against “the Koran with its ostracism and its insufficiency, its hateful prescriptions, 
its laws as barbaric as they are sensual.” In his view, “only force,” upon which rested 
extraterritorial privileges, could “safeguard European freedoms”, and preserve one of 
France’s “oldest and most glorious conquests.”91 Comte Maillard de Marafy, a lawyer 
specialized in international property rights and Alexandria resident, rejected the reform on the 
grounds that under the veneer of modern technology, “fanaticism” still held sway over 
Egyptian minds: “the dividing line drawn by the Capitulations and treaties, between races 
with deeply opposed sentiments and institutions, must be maintained for many more years, 
and probably for ever.”92 If the initial protests had conservative undertones, with many 
paying homage to the efforts of the old monarchy to establish French preeminence in the 
Levant, a spate of republican pamphlets and articles in 1875 also considered the creation of 
an independent judiciary in the Muslim East as an impossibility: “Egyptian civilization”, La 
République française, the mouthpiece of the republican leader Léon Gambetta asserted, was a 
“flimflam.”93  
On 18 December 1875, France became the last European country to ratify the 
international agreement on Egyptian judicial reform, after the French National Assembly 
disregarded a recommendation of its own legislative committee to reject it. This reluctant 
acceptance was brought about by the fear of diplomatic isolation, compounded by the 
purchase of the Khedive’s Suez Canal shares by the British government only three weeks 
earlier.94 However, the resistance of French officials and French opinion had yielded major 
concessions that profoundly altered the economy of the reform envisaged in 1867. Not only 
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did the new mixed courts – three tribunals in Alexandria, Cairo and Zagazig (Mansoura after 
1878) and an appeals court in Alexandria – see their jurisdiction limited almost exclusively to 
commercial aspects of civil law, with consular tribunals and indigenous courts retaining 
theirs for criminal affairs and matters of personal status (nationality, inheritance, marriage 
etc.), but European magistrates appointed by their respective governments would form a 
majority of the courts’ benches. The courts were governed by codes – especially in 
commercial matters, their principal field of competence – closely inspired by French 
legislation and French, one of their working languages alongside Arabic and Italian, would 
rapidly become the exclusive one in practice. The terms of Egypt’s legal entanglement with 
Europe and France in particular were altered, but its intensity did not diminish. 
Extraterritoriality was in reality consolidated under a new Franco-international guise.  
 
 
Franco-international law within Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty 
 
To what extent the courts created by the judicial reform should be considered an Egyptian 
institution proved a moot point almost as soon as they were inaugurated in January 1876. The 
Egyptian and most foreign governments subscribed to their nominal description as emanating 
from national sovereignty. In scholarly and popular opinion, however, they were almost 
universally seen as an international body, whose authority emanated from the common will 
of European great powers. Hesitations about the courts’ very name were revealing. “Mixed 
tribunals” was initially avoided because it created a confusion with the mixed courts of the 
Ottoman empire. Official documents therefore tended to use the awkward phrase “Tribunaux 
de la Réforme,” rendered in English by “Reformed Tribunals”. Yet in practice, “[t]he title by 
which they are generally known” was, as early as 1881, “International Tribunals.”95 
The new courts were not only international in the sense that they were the product of 
a diplomatic compromise between different national governments, European and Egyptian. 
They should also be seen as typical of new kind of institutions and legal norms autonomous 
of national sovereigns, which drew its inspiration from the movement for international law 
associated with the Institut du Droit International, founded in 1873.96 Tellingly, several 
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leading lights of the movement applauded to the creation of the new courts as an instrument 
for spreading civilized (Western) law in a spirit of “internationality.”97 Friedrich Martens, the 
Russian lawyer and diplomat, even hoped that these “in reality foreign tribunals with a very 
extended jurisdiction in Egypt” should form the kernel of “an international administration.”98 
Consciously or not, Martens’ suggestion nodded to the grander proposal of James Lorimer, 
another enthusiast of international law, for an international government in Constantinople, 
formulated the same year as the Egyptian courts’ inauguration. In Lorimer’s vision, this 
international government, staffed by Europeans and using French as its “organ of 
intercommunication,” would have held responsibility for the administration of Ottoman 
provinces as well as the drafting and execution of global legislation.99  
Egypt’s new courts may be construed as a very partial implementation of this imperial 
scheme. European advocates of judicial reform in Egypt were as likely as their opponents to 
use the imperialist language of “legal Orientalism.”100 For instance a French lawyer and 
member of the Association pour la réforme et la codification du droit des gens defended the 
reform as a means of rolling back the influence of the Koran, “a stationary law, hostile to 
progress”: “The reform means Christian civilization penetrating the world of Islam under the 
robes of European magistracy.”101 As it happens, the robes of the new magistrates proved an 
immediate object of controversy after the courts’ inauguration, with the Egyptian government 
keen to imprint a visible stamp of its nominal sovereignty. Against their own wishes, the 
western judges eventually consented to wear the tarboosh (fez) hat and a red scarf inspired by 
the istanbulin of Ottoman functionaries over European judges’ robes. This concession, a 
Dutch judge on the Alexandria court feared, endangered the courts’ “international 
character.”102  
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A French lawyer visiting Egypt soon after the new courts’ inauguration noted these 
sartorial details, but thought them of little import. Instead, his overall impression was that 
when attending audiences, “one believed oneself to be in Europe and more particularly in 
France”: “Layout of the room, dress and functions of prosecuting and judging magistrates, 
clerks, bailiffs, advocates, reading of the roll of cases, court proceedings, closing speeches, 
submissions by the prosecutor, deliberations, decisions or judgements, everything recalls our 
Courts and tribunals.”103 Indeed, the mixed courts, the new native courts modelled upon them 
in 1884, training at the University of Cairo and at the prestigious Ecole française de droit du 
Caire by French professors (and at the former institution by British professors educated in 
France, or recruited in French Canada) consolidated the influence of French legal ideas, 
leading a recent study to speak of a system of “Franco-Egyptian” law in late nineteenth-
century, British-occupied Egypt.104  
Despite their role in spearheading the partial Frenchification of Egypt’s legal system, 
the new mixed or international courts were no more an exclusive instrument of French than 
Egyptian or British interests. They soon extended their commercial jurisdiction to most of 
Egyptian economic life by means of the doctrine of “mixed interest,” whereby any degree of 
foreign involvement – for instance the ownership of a single share by a foreigner or a foreign 
company in an Egyptian company – gave them full competence.105 Within a few months of 
their inauguration, they asserted their independence from the Khediviate, and to a lesser 
extent from Britain and France, by upholding the claims of individual bondholders against 
Egyptian decrees taken with the consent of the British and French governments to consolidate 
the national debt. Their intervention helped precipitate the country’s disorderly bankruptcy 
and ensuing crisis, which concluded with British occupation in 1882.106 As noted by 
contemporaries, it also amounted to an extension of jurisdiction beyond the practice of 
European judiciaries, which in Britain, France and elsewhere held themselves incompetent in 
matters of sovereign debt as pertaining to international law.107 The mixed courts’ original 
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jurisprudence later led a French lawyer in Egypt to propose the creation of a new field of 
“droit privé international interne” (internal international private law).108   
 Internationalization eradicated the worst abuses arising out the extraterritorial regime 
without entirely depoliticizing extraterritoriality. Within the courts, European governments 
jockeyed for positions and influence. France, in particular, went to great lengths to maintain 
the allegiance of its judges, for instance by making years of service in the mixed courts 
counting towards advancement and pension entitlement in France.109 France’s first appointees 
were elite magistrates, including Aristide Letourneux, an Orientalist scholar and “one of the 
most distinguished judges” on the Algiers appeals court, to the Alexandria appeals court, and 
the younger Alfred Vacher, a state prosecutor at Dignes deemed “one of the best magistrates 
within their circuit” by the court of Aix-en-Provence, as deputy prosecutor of the same court. 
Vacher went on to serve as prosecutor of the Alexandria court between 1879 and 1888, 
during which years he kept up an abundant correspondence with the French ministry of 
justice about his efforts to promote French influence and interests, from the replacement of 
Italians by French Corsicans as clerks of the court to the indemnification of French nationals 
after the troubles of 1882.110  
In addition to leaving consular jurisdiction intact for personal status and criminal 
matters, internationalization therefore regulated the modalities of civil-commercial 
extraterritoriality, but it did not curtail it. The new regime even consolidated 
extraterritoriality by placing it beyond the reach of any single sovereign power, Egyptian or 
European. After Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, British colonial officials found the mixed 
courts, especially as they acquired a near monopoly over legislation – including taxation – 
that affected European residents, a considerable obstacle to their efforts to govern and reform 
the country. This “international top-hamper,” the British administrator Alfred Milner 
complained, restrained British power much more effectively than the remnants of 
extraterritorial privileges in Tunisia after France’s occupation in 1881. 111 The “ultra-
privileged” status of Europeans guaranteed by the mixed courts also incensed Lord Cromer, 
Britain’s proconsul in Egypt between 1882 and 1907, and led him to conclude that “in spite 
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of its fair exterior … internationalism means but too often in practice political egotism [of 
Britain’s imperial rivals] a disregard of the rights of subject races.”112 The imperial hollowing 
out of Egyptian sovereignty had turned into a limitation of imperial rule, but to the benefit of 
other European empires rather than Egyptian subjects.  
 
 
Far from promoting the construction of sovereignty, legal reforms in Egypt had consecrated, 
in the words of the director of the French law school in Cairo, a regime of “sovereignty … 
divided” between the (Anglo-)Egyptian government and “international society.” 113 This 
regime of international extraterritoriality proved remarkably stable. The Livre d’or published 
to celebrate the mixed courts’ fiftieth anniversary in 1926 did not anticipate their demise. 
Instead, it included a series of essays on “the future” of the courts, which argued for further 
expansion of their jurisdiction.114 Published in 1930, the first scholarly history of the courts 
also voiced the hope that “the near future will witness a material enlargement of their 
usefulness.”115 It appears to have been contingent political factors, especially fears of a 
rapprochement between the nationalist Wafd party and the Italo-German Axis, rather than the 
transformation of Egypt’s legal landscape, which led Britain and France to acquiesce to the 
gradual dismantling of extraterritoriality in 1937, a process only completed with the abolition 
of the mixed courts in 1949.116 From the 1840s until the aftermath of the Second World War, 
imperial extraterritoriality, partly internationalized in the 1876, lasted longer than formal 
colonial rule in most of Sub Saharan Africa, making it difficult to view it as a mere transition 
towards the assertion of Egyptian sovereignty.  
Instead, it may be analytically more productive to consider the expansion of imperial 
extraterritoriality in Egypt as an extreme but paradigmatic instance of a broader trend in the 
world’s legal regime, towards the multiplication of jurisdictional enclaves underneath newly 
minted sovereignties in some parts of the extra-European world, from the early nineteenth 
century onwards. Such enclaves differed from those to be found in traditional plural legal 
orders because they were tightly controlled by external polities, almost always European 
imperial formations. They served different, although not mutually exclusive, purposes. As 
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suggested by Benton and confirmed here by British policy in the Ottoman world, enclaves 
could be conceived of as having a transitory educational purpose, to encourage the 
emergence of European-style territorial sovereign jurisdictions, especially when the enclaves 
included few metropolitan Britons. Conversely, as shown by French practice in Egypt, 
enclaves could be designed to undermine without entirely sapping plenary sovereignty, in 
order to maintain an extra-European polity in a profitable state of partial subjection. 
Interestingly, the reorganisation of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China at the turn of the 
1870s mirrored, in an exacerbated fashion, Anglo-French disagreements over Egyptian 
judicial reform: while Britain sponsored the establishment of an “international mixed court” 
in Shanghai, incorporated into the Chinese legal order but dominated by British and 
American magistrates, France opted to maintain its own mixed consular court under the 
supervision of the French colonial judiciary in Indochina.117 The French preference for a 
national and predatory style of extraterritoriality may have resulted from circumstantial 
factors, such as a larger proportion of emigrants outside formal colonial possessions or a 
more limited capacity to project military power overseas than Britain. Yet it should also be 
connected with the self-conscious pursuit of a French “empire of law and language,” as 
opposed to Britain’s mercantile empire of commodities, since the 1790s, and the popularity 
of schemes of imperial domination by informal means in French intellectual life, politics and 
diplomatic services in the nineteenth century.118  
If the exceptional reach of extraterritoriality in Egypt owed a great deal to this 
expansive French conception, the internationalization of the resulting enclaves underneath 
Egyptian sovereignty conformed to British aspirations. Such international institutions 
complemented rather than contradicted the British preference for an “empire of states” when 
such states failed to emerge, with colonial occupation by Britain or another power too costly 
or dangerous alternatives.119 Even after Egypt’s occupation in 1882, the actual deference – 
despite their complaints and criticisms – of British administrators to Egypt’s new judicial 
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system and their acceptance of Egyptian law’s partial Frenchification are revealing of a 
persistent commitment to the resolution of imperial problems by international legal means, an 
imperial internationalism which anticipated a common British conception of the League of 
Nations.120 Ultimately, however, it is likely that the high degree of legal internationalization 
in Egypt reflected the country’s significance as a major avenue for the global circulation of 
commodities, especially after the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869. Other concrete 
efforts to reconcile European imperial interests by international legal means also focused on 
locations deemed crucial for international trade, such as the Chinese seaboard or the Congo 
basin, where the international “free state” of King Leopold accorded extensive extraterritorial 
rights to European residents.121 It remains true that most of the globe passed under national or 
colonial territorial jurisdiction in the nineteenth century. Yet the parallel emergence of 
increasingly internationalized pockets of extraterritoriality, often encompassing the new 
hinges of the global economy outside Europe, should be held a significant countervailing 
feature of the modern world’s legal regime. 
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